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Saving the Mekong River Basin

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  • Houba, Harold
  • Pham Do, Kim Hang
  • Zhu, Xueqin

Abstract

The Mekong River (MR) is shared by six countries: China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Over the years there have been both conflict and cooperation on managing the water resources to meet population growth, climate change and the desire for economic development. Currently, the MR Committee (MRC) has weak policy instruments. This paper exploits an axiomatic bargaining approach to examine how China and the MRC might negotiate effective joint management. We investigate what welfare improvements arise from strengthening the MRC and propose an alternative offering for the MR's joint management that is preferable to the status quo from the perspective of all nations. We show that there are little gains from cooperation unless international institutions provide a budget to promote cooperation with China. Alternatively, strengthening the MR Committee has the potential to achieve large welfare improvements.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 37407.

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Date of creation: Jun 2011
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:37407

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Keywords: transboundary river basin; Mekong River; optimization; Nash bargaining solution;

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  1. Harold Houba, 2008. "Computing Alternating Offers And Water Prices In Bilateral River Basin Management," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(03), pages 257-278.
  2. Haddad, Mohamed S., 2011. "Capacity choice and water management in hydroelectricity systems," Energy Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 168-177, March.
  3. Ringler, Claudia, 2001. "Optimal Water Allocation In The Mekong River Basin," Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF) 18745, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
  4. Sophie Thoyer & Sylvie Morardet & Patrick Rio & Leo Simon & Rachael Goodhue & Gordon Rausser, 2001. "A Bargaining Model to Simulate Negotiations Between Water Users," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 4(2), pages 6.
  5. Harold Houba, 0000. "Alternating Offers in Economic Environments," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-064/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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