Can religious priming induce truthful preference revelation?
AbstractWe examine whether religious priming can induce more truthful preference revelation in valuation research. Using induced value second price Vickrey auctions in both hypothetical and non-hypothetical contexts, our results suggest that religious priming can indeed induce more truthful bidding and eliminate hypothetical bias in hypothetical contexts. In non-hypothetical contexts where there are real economic incentives, religious priming induces similar truthful bidding as the absence of religious priming, implying that the use of real economic incentives is sufficient in producing truthful valuations. Our findings have significant implications for the use of religious priming in stated preference or contingent valuation studies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 34433.
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2011
Date of revision:
willingness-to-pay (WTP); Vickrey auction; hypothetical bias; religious priming;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-11-07 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-11-07 (Experimental Economics)
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