La influencia de las instituciones en la racionalidad del individuo a partir de Adam Smith
[The influence of institutions on individuals rationality from Adam Smith]
AbstractThe Neoclassical Theory assumes that individuals are essentially selfish and maximize the utility of their income, measured on some utility scale. It defines the rationality of individuals based on preference relations, which should not change by the context. However, it is a fact that individuals do not generally use these “market rules” with their families, friends, colleagues or in their neighborhoods. This behavior has been seen as “Bounded rationality” or “failures” in the individual’s behavior. The main objective of this paper is to explore this kind of behavior and pose some questions about how institutions influence the preferences and decisions of individuals in some contexts. The assumption we have is: In reality, the homo economicus considers context as additional information and reacts on that basis. He adapts to the community with which he interacts as a matter of “survival”. We conclude that there is a “Broader rationality” in that behavior, which goes beyond the one defined in the Neoclassical Theory, which is applicable in highly specific conditions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 32018.
Date of creation: 05 Oct 2006
Date of revision:
B12; B13; B52; D46; D01; D02;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D46 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Value Theory
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- B12 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Classical (includes Adam Smith)
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