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Budgetary processes: a political economy perspective

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  • Goyal, Ashima

Abstract

The response to macro shocks, given the electoral structure, built in perverse incentives that influenced India's development process. The chapter selectively surveys political economic theory, Indian and other country experience to bring out the systemic incentives that affect political behaviour, government budgets, and expenditure. Conceptual categories developed are found useful in interpreting Indian experience. Overtime, conflicts between groups were handled in a way that lowered incentives for expansion of the cake, and led to a short-term focus. Price controls bred inefficiencies, especially after the oil shocks. But there are leverage points for change. Well-coordinated macro policy, including infrastructure spending, with some restraints on political-bureaucratic choices, could create incentives for rapid growth. The latter eases political adjustments. It makes longer-term sustainable re-distribution feasible, and raises returns to choices that improve human capital.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 27786.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:27786

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Related research

Keywords: perverse political incentives; macro shocks; price controls; political bureaucratic choices;

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References

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  1. Ashima Goyal & A. K. Jha, 2005. "Dictatorship, Democracy and Institutions: Macropolicy in China and India," Working Papers id:264, eSocialSciences.
  2. Goyal, Ashima, 1999. "The Political Economy of the Revenue Deficit," MPRA Paper 29980, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Goyal, Ashima, 2002. "Coordinating monetary and fiscal policies: a role for rules?," MPRA Paper 29200, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey., 1987. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," Working Papers 643, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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Cited by:
  1. Ashima Goyal, 2007. "Governance in India's public transport systems: Comparing Indian railways and airlines," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2007-019, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  2. Ashima Goyal, 2005. "Making the politician and the bureaucrat deliver: Employment guarantee in India," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2005-008, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  3. Gulam Hassan, Mohamed Aslam & Tan, Yee Shin, 2012. "Political Economy of The Budgetary Process in Malaysia," MPRA Paper 37873, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Ashima Goyal, 2009. "Governance in Public Transport Systems: Comparing Indian Railways and Airways," Working Papers id:1857, eSocialSciences.

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