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Political Economy of The Budgetary Process in Malaysia

Author

Listed:
  • Gulam Hassan, Mohamed Aslam
  • Tan, Yee Shin

Abstract

The ruling political party or the ruling government has rights in drafting and implementing economic policies including the budget policy. In the case of Malaysia, as observed, the budget policy is associated with the long or medium term economic development plans that are drafted, current thinking or thought of economic policies and additional measures that would be introduced probably related to major economic events such as the impact of financial or global economic crises. Also the budget includes economic policies according to the ruling party’s manifesto and promises made during the election. Eventhough the budget is the ruling government’s privilege but the government’s financial plan, i.e the allocation and the manner of spending, taxation and borrowing are subject to law, acts, rules and procedures. The ruling government cannot simply utilize economic resources for its political means or interests. This paper argues that there is a solid link between the ruling political party with the preparation of the budget policy. To examine the matter this paper uses the survey method. This paper has found that in the case of Malaysia the Member of Parliaments do influence the outlining of the annual budget.

Suggested Citation

  • Gulam Hassan, Mohamed Aslam & Tan, Yee Shin, 2012. "Political Economy of The Budgetary Process in Malaysia," MPRA Paper 37873, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:37873
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Poterba, James M, 1994. "State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 799-821, August.
    2. Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge & Tungodden, Bertil, 2003. "Fiscal Corruption: A Vice or a Virtue?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 31(8), pages 1459-1467, August.
    3. Goyal, Ashima, 2003. "Budgetary processes: a political economy perspective," MPRA Paper 27786, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political Institutions; Elections; Development Plans; Budget Policy; Malaysia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O23 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • O20 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - General
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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