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Corporate governance and innovation: an organizational perspective

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  • Belloc, Filippo

Abstract

Traditional economic studies of innovation, built on the contribution of Schumpeter, cannot explain why firms of the same size and market power can show largely different innovation performances. Contrastingly, the literature on corporate governance provides some useful insights for understanding corporate innovation activity, to the extent that such literature examines the economic consequences of different modes of coordination between firm participants. The process through which individuals integrate their human and physical resources within the firm is indeed central to the dynamic of corporate innovation. This paper provides the first survey of the literature on this issue. We start by discussing why a theory of the firm must be put at the base of an economic analysis of corporate innovation. We then describe three main channels – corporate ownership, corporate finance and labour – through which a system of corporate governance shapes firm innovation activity. Finally, we examine the recent literature on national structures of governance.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 21495.

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Date of creation: 10 Jan 2010
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:21495

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Keywords: corporate governance; innovation; theory of the firm; specific investments;

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