This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Free Entry Bertrand Competition

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper examines Bertrand competition under free entry, when firm size vis-a-vis market size is exogenously given. A free entry Bertrand Nash equilibrium (FEBE) exists if and only if relative market size is sufficiently large. Further, there is a unique coalition-proof Nash equilibrium price that corresponds to the minimum FEBE price, leads to average cost pricing for all active firms and is decreasing in market size.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17837/
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17837.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17837

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

Related research
Keywords: Bertrand competition; free entry; coalition-proof; contestability.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh, 1995. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Bertrand Equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 19-32, January.
  2. Steffen Hoernig, 2007. "Bertrand Games and Sharing Rules," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 573-585, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Chaudhuri, Prabal Ray, 1996. "The contestable outcome as a Bertrand equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 237-242, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hoernig, Steffen H., 2002. "Mixed Bertrand equilibria under decreasing returns to scale: an embarrassment of riches," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 359-362, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Novshek, William & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2003. "Bertrand equilibria with entry: limit results," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 795-808, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc stands for Research Papers in Economics.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-1.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.