Coalition-proof Bertrand equilibria
AbstractThis paper examines the coalition-proof Nash equilibria of a Bertrand model of price competition where firms supply all demand. When firms are asymmetric we prove existence and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. For symmetric firms, we show that an equilibrium is necessarily unique. We also examine whether this unique equilibrium outcome is implementable through a sequential move game where the firms take turns at announcing prices. Finally we examine the limiting property of such equilibria as the number of firms go to infinity. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 24 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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- Prabal, Roy Chowdhury, 2008.
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- Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2009. "Mixed Duopoly with Price Competition," MPRA Paper 9220, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Chia-Hung Sun & Fu-Chuan Lai, 2013. "Hotelling was right with decreasing returns to scale and a coalition-proof refinement," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 953-971, June.
- Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2009. "Free Entry Bertrand Competition," MPRA Paper 17837, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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