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Bertrand Equilibria and Sharing Rules

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Author Info
Hoernig, Steffen

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Abstract

We analyze how sharing rules affect Nash equilibria in Bertrand games, where the sharing of profits at ties is a decisive assumption. Necessary conditions for either positive or zero equilibrium profits are derived. Zero profit equilibria are shown to exist under weak conditions if the sharing rule is sign-preserving. For Bertrand markets we define the class of expectation sharing rules, where profits at ties are derived from some distribution of quantities. In this class the winner-take-all sharing rule is the only one that is always sign-preserving, while for each pair of demand and cost functions there may be many others.

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Paper provided by Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia in its series FEUNL Working Paper Series with number wp468.

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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp468

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Related research
Keywords: Bertrand games Sharing rule Tie-breaking rule Sign-preserving sharing rules Expectation sharing rules

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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  1. Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh, 1995. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Bertrand Equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 19-32, January.
  2. Simon, Leo K & Zame, William R, 1990. "Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 861-72, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Dasgupta, Partha & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 1-26, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hoernig, Steffen H., 2002. "Mixed Bertrand equilibria under decreasing returns to scale: an embarrassment of riches," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 359-362, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "Price Competition in a Capacity-Constrained Duopoly," Working Papers 83-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1029-1056, September.
  7. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "A re-evaluation of perfect competition as the solution to the Bertrand price game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 315-328, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Sharkey, William W. & Sibley, David S., 1993. "A Bertrand model of pricing and entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 199-206. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Baye, Michael R. & Morgan, John, 1999. "A folk theorem for one-shot Bertrand games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 59-65, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Todd R. Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2000. "The possibility of mixed-strategy equilibria with constant-returns-to-scale technology under Bertrand competition," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 65-71. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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