Modeling a Multi-Choice Game Based on the Spirit of Equal Job Opportunities (New)
AbstractThe H&R Shapley value defined by Hsiao and Raghavan for multi-choice cooperative game is redundant free. If the H&R Shapley value is used as the solution of a game, there won't be any objection to a player's taking redundant actions. Therefore, the spirit of the law on equal job opportunities is automatically fulfilled. Also, if the H&R Shapley value is used as the solution of a game, it makes no difference to the players whether they have the same number of options or not. Moreover, the D&P Shapley value, the P&Z Shapley value and the WAC value are linear combinations of the H&R Shapley value, hence, they have all the same dummy free properties and the independent property as does the H&R Shapley value. Finally the N&P Shapley value is not redundant free.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 16023.
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Shapley value; multi-choice cooperative game; redundant free; independent of non-essential players.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2009-07-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2009-07-11 (Microeconomics)
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- Hsiao, Chih-Ru & Yeh, Yeong-Nan & Mo, Jie-Ping, 1994. "The Potential of Multi-choice Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 15007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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