Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game
AbstractBased on the simple model of the deposit the methodology of finding the optimal solution for bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite mine and power plant is shown taking into account pit optimisation. It is proposed to treat lignite price negotiation as a kind of game. In the first stage (cooperative) both sides should select the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM and in the second one (competitive) the agreement should be achieved regarding profit division. This can be realised through side payments or by establishing the lignite transfer price. Lack of cooperation and opportunism can lead to the suboptimal solution – excavation of the smaller pit. Due to information asymmetry realisation of the optimal solution is more probably in vertically integrated firms. Dynamic adjustments of LOM BM plan to short-term changes of energy market using optimisation, BM model, game theory and their valuation as real options is the new direction of further re-search.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 1600.
Date of creation: 24 Sep 2006
Date of revision: 24 Sep 2006
Publication status: Published in Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium Continuous Surface Mining Department of Mining Engineering III, RWTH Aachen University.ISBN 3(2006): pp. 469-476
bilateral monopoly; co-operative game; price negotiation; non-zero sum game; Pareto optimal solution; lignite price; power plant; lignite mine; pit optimisation; optimal ultimate pit; pit phases;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- Q31 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply
- L72 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-02-10 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENE-2007-02-10 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-02-10 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006.
"Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć pierwsza – podstawy teoretyczne
[Nash bargaining solution and the split of p," MPRA Paper 4142, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Jan 2006.
- Blair, Roger D & Kaserman, David L, 1987. "A Note on Bilateral Monopoly and Formula Price Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 460-63, June.
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