Czy integracja pionowa kopalń odkrywkowych węgla z elektrowniami jest korzystna i dla kogo?
AbstractIs vertical integration of mines and power plants profitable and for whom? Based on outcomes from the research of bilateral relation between lignite mines and power plant author describes several benefits from vertical integration including strategic benefits described by Porter and benefits from reduction of transactional costs described by Williamson. Additional benefits can be attained by application of open pit optimisation which leads to the solution of modified bilateral monopoly of lignite mine and power plant. Cooperation can assure joint profits maximisation and rivalry leads to suboptimal solution in Pareto sense. Due to asymmetry of information about the deposit the mine has information advantage and can apply its predominant solution maximising only their own profits in long run.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 534.
Date of creation: 29 Mar 2005
Date of revision: 31 Mar 2005
bilateral monopoly; lignite mine; power plant; market structure; trasactional costs; lignite price; price negotiation; strategic benefits; bargaining; cooperative game; Pareto optimality; asymmetry of information;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
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- L72 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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"Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część III – Obliczenia cen i zysków dla hipotetycznych danych
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- Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006.
"Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału
[Lignite price as a determinant of the split of profit in systems of min," MPRA Paper 2384, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Mar 2007.
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