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Wpływ struktury organizacyjno-właścicielskiej na funkcjonowanie bilateralnego monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni

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Author Info
Jurdziak, Leszek

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Abstract

THE INFLUENCE OF OWNERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ON OPERATION OF BILATERAL MONOPOLY OF LIGNITE MINE AND POWER PLANT Lignite mine & power plant can operate as two separate entities (having the same or different owners), two entities operating in one holding (with joint owner) or as one vertically integrated energy producer. Each of these solutions has the influence on operation of this body including realization of its parts and the whole entity objectives, price negotiation etc. In the paper an attempt has been made to show these problems from the point of view of economic effectiveness.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/533/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 533.

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Date of creation: 23 Oct 2006
Date of revision: 23 Oct 2006
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:533

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Related research
Keywords: bilateral monopoly; price negotiation; lignite price; Pareto optimal production; Pareto suboptimal solution; co-operation; rivalry; lignite minel power plant;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L72 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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