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Negocjacje pomiędzy kopalnią węgla brunatnego a elektrownią jako kooperacyjna, dwuetapowa gra dwuosobowa o sumie niezerowej

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  • Jurdziak, Leszek

Abstract

Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game. Based on the simple model of the lignite deposit the methodology of finding the optimal solution for bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite mine and power plant is shown taking into account nested pits generated by the pit optimisation process. It is proposed to treat lignite price negotiation as a kind of two-stage game. In the first step (cooperative) both sides should select the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM and in the second one (competitive) the agreement should be achieved regarding profit division. This can be realised through side payments or by establishing the lignite transfer price. Lack of cooperation and opportunism can lead to the suboptimal solution – excavation of the smaller pit. Due to existence of information asymmetry and the mine predominant strategy attainment of the optimal solution is more probably in vertically integrated firms. Dynamic adjustments of LOM BM plan to short-term changes of energy market using optimisation techniques, BM model, game theory and their valuation as real options is the new direction of further research.

Suggested Citation

  • Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Negocjacje pomiędzy kopalnią węgla brunatnego a elektrownią jako kooperacyjna, dwuetapowa gra dwuosobowa o sumie niezerowej," MPRA Paper 478, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Feb 2000.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:478
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Odkrywkowa kopalnia węgla brunatnego i elektrownia jako bilateralny monopol w ujęciu klasycznym," MPRA Paper 530, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Oct 2006.
    2. Underwood, Robert & Tolwinski, Boleslaw, 1998. "A mathematical programming viewpoint for solving the ultimate pit problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 96-107, May.
    3. Blair, Roger D & Kaserman, David L, 1987. "A Note on Bilateral Monopoly and Formula Price Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 460-463, June.
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    1. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć druga – zastosowania w negocjacjach strategicznych i taktycznych [Nash bargaining so," MPRA Paper 4163, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Jan 2006.
    2. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć pierwsza – podstawy teoretyczne [Nash bargaining solution and the split of profit in," MPRA Paper 4142, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Jan 2006.
    3. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału [Lignite price as a determinant of the split of profit in systems of mines and pow," MPRA Paper 2384, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Mar 2007.
    4. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Wpływ struktury organizacyjno-właścicielskiej na funkcjonowanie bilateralnego monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni," MPRA Paper 533, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Oct 2006.
    5. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część II – Formuły cen węgla brunatnego [Lignite price as a determinant of the split of profit in systems of min," MPRA Paper 2385, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Mar 2007.
    6. Jurdziak, Leszek & Woźniak (Wiktorowicz), Justyna, 2008. "Identyfikacja Czynników Ryzyka W Bilateralnym Monopolu Kopalni I Elektrowni [Identification Of Risk Factors In A Bilateral Monopoly Of A Mine And A Power Plant]," MPRA Paper 75181, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bilateral monopoly; opencast mine; pit optimisation; price negotiation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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