Controlling Collusion in Auctions: The Role of Ceilings and Reserve Prices
AbstractWe examine a simple model of collusion under a single-object second-price auction. Under the appropriate parameter conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves both an effective ceiling, as well as a reserve price.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 1503.
Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Auctions; ceilings; collusion; reserve prices;
Other versions of this item:
- Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2008. "Controlling collusion in auctions: The role of ceilings and reserve prices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 98(3), pages 240-246, March.
- Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2007. "Controlling collusion in auctions: The Role of ceilings and reserve prices," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 07-02, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-01-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-01-23 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2007-01-23 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2007-01-23 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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