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Risk taking for others: an experiment on ethics meetings

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco Feri
  • Caterina Giannetti
  • Pietro Guarnieri

Abstract

Relying on an novel experimental design, we study the effect of, so called, ethics meetings on risktaking for others decisions in a situation where preferences of a decision maker are not aligned with those of a passive receiver. Decision makers choose between two risky gambles, one of which always implies a better outcome for himself but exposes the receiver to higher risk. In the main treatments (i.e. Ethics meeting), in contrast to the Baseline treatment, decision makers also discuss within a group of peers Eô before their decision Eô the consequences of their choice. Our results show that, in treatments with ethics meetings, decision makers tend to choose more often the less risky gamble for the receiver.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Feri & Caterina Giannetti & Pietro Guarnieri, 2017. "Risk taking for others: an experiment on ethics meetings," Discussion Papers 2017/229, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  • Handle: RePEc:pie:dsedps:2017/229
    Note: ISSN 2039-1854
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    File URL: https://www.ec.unipi.it/documents/Ricerca/papers/2017-229.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    discussion; moral psychology; ethics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G02 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Behavioral Finance: Underlying Principles
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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