Up methods in the allocation of indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked

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Up methods in the allocation of indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked

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Carmen Herrero () (Department of Economics, Universidad de Alicante)
Ricardo Martinez () (Department of Economics, Universidad de Alicante & Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide)

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Carmen Herrero

Abstract

We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents' preferences are single-peaked. We propose natural rules (called up methods) to solve such a class of problems. We analyzed the properties those methods satisfy and we provide a characterization of them. We also prove that these methods can be interpreted as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called equal-distance rule.

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Paper provided by Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Departamento de Economía in its series Working Papers with number 06.30.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2006
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Handle: RePEc:pab:wpaper:06.30

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2006-11-12 (All new papers)
NEP-CDM-2006-11-12 (Collective Decision-Making)
NEP-GTH-2006-11-12 (Game Theory)
NEP-UPT-2006-11-12 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 511-520. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of Axioms for Bankruptcy Problems," Working Paper Series no1, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
Carmen Herrero & Ricardo Martinez, 2006. "Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked," Working Papers 06.29, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Carmen Herrero Blanco & Ricardo Martínez, 2006. "Allocation Problems With Indivisibilities When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-14, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).

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