A New Type of Preference Reversal
AbstractThe classic preference reversal phenomenon arises in a comparison between a choice and a matching task. We present a new type of preference reversal which is entirely choice-based. Because choice is the basic primitive of economics, the preference reversal we observe is more troubling for economics. The preference reversal was observed in two experiments, both involving large representative samples from the Spanish population. The data were collected by professional interviewers in face-to-face interviews. Possible explanations for the preference reversal are the anticipation of disappointment and elation in risky choice and the impact of ethical considerations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 06.18.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2006
Date of revision:
Preference reversal; Choice behavior; Stochastic dominance; Disappointment and elation; Health;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-07-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2006-07-15 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-DCM-2006-07-15 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-EVO-2006-07-15 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2006-07-15 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2006-07-15 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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