Some Economics of Banking Reform
AbstractWhere do we stand, five years on from the start of the crisis, on progress towards banking reform? Major advances have been made, but a lot of unfinished business remains, notably on structural reform of banks. Following a stock-take of current reform initiatives, the paper reviews some economics of public policy towards banks, starting with the rationale for deposit guarantees and lender-of-last-resort support but concentrating on why governments feel compelled to provide solvency support in crisis. It then covers the economics of capital requirements â€“ and loss-absorbency more generally â€“ and examines why such regulation is a better approach than taxation to address systemic risk externalities, and why the public interest requires much more capital than banks would choose. The role of structural regulation in making banking systems safer is then analysed, in particular forms of separation between retail and investment banking such as ring-fencing (as in current UK reforms) and complete separation (as in the US before the repeal of Glass-Steagall). The paper concludes with some reflections on the wider European policy debate in the light of the Liikanen Report on structural reform. A central theme of the analysis is that banking reform needs a well-designed combination of policies towards loss-absorbency and structural reform.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 632.
Date of creation: 30 Nov 2012
Date of revision:
Banking; bail-outs; capital requirements; deposit guarantees; Glass-Steagall; resolution; ring-fencing; structural reform; Volcker rule;
Other versions of this item:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2013-02-03 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2013-02-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2013-02-03 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2013-02-03 (Central Banking)
- NEP-REG-2013-02-03 (Regulation)
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- Leonardo Gambacorta & Adrian Van Rixtel, 2013. "Structural bank regulation initiatives: approaches and implications," BIS Working Papers 412, Bank for International Settlements.
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