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Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games

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  • Alan Beggs

Abstract

This paper studies uniqueness of equilibrium in symmetric 2 x 2 bayesian games.� It shows that if signals are highly but not perfectly dependent then players play their risk-dominant actions for all but a vanishing set of signal realizations.� In contrast to the global games literature, noise is not assumed to be additive.� Dependence is modeled using the theory of copulas.

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File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/5775/paper603.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 603.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 2012
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:603

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Keywords: Bayesian games; Global games; Uniqueness; Copulas; Risk dominance;

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  1. Carlsson, H. & Damme, E.E.C. van, 1990. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1990-52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. David M. Frankel & Stephen Morris & Ady Pauzner, 2000. "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 1490, Econometric Society.
  3. Van Zandt, Timothy & Vives, Xavier, 2003. "Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games of Strategic Complementarities," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 4103, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Athey, S., 1997. "Sigle Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 97-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  5. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
  6. Alfred Müller & Marco Scarsini, 2003. "Archimedean Copulae and Positive Dependence," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research 25-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  7. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521496032 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Nelsen, Roger B. & Quesada-Molina, José Juan & Rodri­guez-Lallena, José Antonio & Úbeda-Flores, Manuel, 2008. "On the construction of copulas and quasi-copulas with given diagonal sections," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 473-483, April.
  9. repec:sae:ecolab:v:16:y:2006:i:2:p:1-2 is not listed on IDEAS
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