Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Leading the Way: Coalitional Stability in Technological Cooperation & Sequential Climate Policy

Contents:

Author Info

  • Thomas Norman
  • Heinrich H. Nax

Abstract

The World's nations have yet to reach a truly effective treaty to control the emission of greenhouse gases.� The importance of compatibility with private incentives of individual countries has been acknowledged (at least by game theorists) in designing climate policies for the post-Kyoto world.� Individually incentive-compatible agreements, however, may still be spoilt if coalitional incentives to deviate as a group exist.� As a first step toward understanding these incentives from a game-theoretic perspective, we propose a hybrid noncooperative-cooperative game theory model of coalition formation in technology collaboration.� Serious coalitional instabilities inherent to the existing climate policy architectures are revealed.� It turns out that coalitionally stable agreements are achieved via intermediate self-selecting subcoalitions.� The sequence of coalitions forming and the size of the direct and spillover effects of R&D collaboration on countries' individual production technologies determine the effectiveness of the agreements to reduce carbon emissions.� These coalitional group motives are already becoming important in the practice of climate change negotiations.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/5528/paper585.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 585.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:585

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Manor Rd. Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ
Email:
Web page: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Climate change policy; Coalitions; Cooperative game theory; Environmental agreements; Externalities; Mechanism design; Noncooperative game theory; R&D;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Bård Harstad, 2010. "The Dynamics of Climate Agreements," CESifo Working Paper Series 2962, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Carlo Carraro & Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 2006_44, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
  3. Barrett, Scott, 2005. "The theory of international environmental agreements," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1516 Elsevier.
  4. Bard Harstad, 2012. "Climate Contracts: A Game of Emissions, Investments, Negotiations, and Renegotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(4), pages 1527-1557.
  5. Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Michael Finus, 2006. "Permit trading and stability of international climate agreements," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 19-48, May.
  6. Levy, Philip I & Srinivasan, T N, 1996. "Regionalism and the (Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Access," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 93-98, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:585. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Caroline Wise).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.