Cooperation in Multiple Spheres of Interaction
AbstractThis note introduces transferable utility cooperative games with multiple membership, extending the scope of cooperative game theory to economic environments featuring externalities and membership in multiple coalitions.� This wider class of games generalises games in characteristic and partition function form.� definitions of the core for this class of games are proposed, under which cooperation is facilitated through the cross-cutting of contractual arrangements with multiple membership.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 394.
Date of creation: 01 May 2008
Date of revision:
Cooperative Game Theory; Core; Externalities; Multiple Membership;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
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