Sistemas de Sanciones por Daños Ambientales para la Fiscalización de la Industria de Hidrocarburos en el Perú
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by OSINERGMIN, Oficina de Estudios Economicos in its series Working Papers with number 20.
Length: 187 pages
Date of creation: May 2006
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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