This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Deliberative Independent Central Bank

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Erwin Jericha () (Vienna University of Technology)
Martin Schürz () (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Economic Analysis Division)
Abstract

The paper develops a communication game that is applied to the question of central bank policy and independence. The game is about the preferred degree of conservatism of monetary policy and the game setting consists of a principal (politics), an agent (central bank) and an observer (financial market participants). The extent of the welfare losses depends on the degree of knowledge, the endogenized signaling of financial market participants and the probability whether the degree of conservatism in monetary policy is adequate to nature. Consequently, a mechanism to minimize welfare losses of the principal has to be implemented. It is shown how the introduction of an institutional control mechanism with a countervailing goal function will improve the utilities for the principal.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.oenb.at/de/img/wp133_tcm14-49232.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank) in its series Working Papers with number 133.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 11 Jun 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:onb:oenbwp:133

Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O. Box 61, A-1011 Vienna, Austria
Phone: +43/1/404 20 7205
Fax: +43/1/404 20 7299
Email:
Web page: http://www.oenb.at/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Economic Studies Division, c/o Beate Hofbauer-Berlakovich, POB 61, A-1011 Vienna, Austria
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Markus Knell and Helmut Stix).

Related research
Keywords: accountability agency losses principal agent model

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
E59 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Other
E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Stanley Fischer, 1995. "Modern Approaches to Central Banking," NBER Working Papers 5064, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alan S. Blinder, 1996. "Central banking in a democracy," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 1-14. [Downloadable!]
  3. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Peter Mooslechner, 1999. "Challenges for Economic Policy Coordination within European Monetary Union," Empirica, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 169-170, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Willem H. Buiter, 1999. "Alice in Euroland," Journal of Common Market Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(2), pages 181-209, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Soskice, David & Iversen, Torben, 1998. "Multiple Wage-Bargaining Systems in the Single European Currency Area," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(3), pages 110-24, Autumn.
  8. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by editing a NEP report.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.