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Fiscal Decentralisation, Chinese Style: Good for Health Outcomes?

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Author Info
Hiroko Uchimura
Johannes P. Jütting ()

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Abstract

This paper analyses the effect of fiscal decentralisation on health outcomes in China using a panel data set with nationwide county-level data. We find that counties in more fiscally decentralised provinces have lower infant mortality rates than counties where the provincial government remains the main spending authority, if certain conditions are met. Spending responsibilities at the local level need to be matched with county governments’ own fiscal capacity. For county governments that have only limited revenues, the ability to spend on local public goods such as health care depends crucially upon intergovernmental transfers. The findings of this paper, therefore, support the common assertion that fiscal decentralisation can lead to more efficient production of local public goods, while also highlighting the conditions required for this result to be obtained.
Ce papier analyse l’effet de la décentralisation fiscale sur la santé en Chine, à partir d’une analyse de panel avec des données de district recueilli au niveau national. Les auteurs trouvent que, sous certaines conditions, les districts aux systèmes plus décentralisés ont des taux de mortalité infantiles moins élevés que ceux où le gouvernement provincial reste la principale autorité. Les responsabilités pour les dépenses au niveau local doivent toutefois être accompagnées de capacités fiscales adéquates. Pour les gouvernements de districts à bas revenus, la capacité à investir dans des biens publics comme les services de santé, dépend principalement des transferts intergouvernementaux. Les analyses confirment l’argument selon lequel la décentralisation fiscale peut mener à une plus grande efficacité des biens publics, en soulignant les conditions nécessaires pour atteindre ce résultat.

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Paper provided by OECD Development Centre in its series OECD Development Centre Working Papers with number 264.

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Date of creation: Nov 2007
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Handle: RePEc:oec:devaaa:264-en

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Related research
Keywords: health santé fiscal decentralisation décentralisation fiscale China Chine Health-care finance financement des services de santé

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Health, Education, and Welfare
I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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  1. Jin, Jing & Zou, Heng-fu, 2005. "Fiscal decentralization, revenue and expenditure assignments, and growth in China," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(6), pages 1047-1064, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Pranab Bardhan, 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 185-205, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jin, Hehui & Qian, Yingyi & Weingast, Barry R., 2005. "Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1719-1742, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-16.


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