AbstractWe show that when avoidable fixed costs are introduced into the capacity-and-entry model of Dixit(1980) and Ware(1984), there arises a coordination problem in selecting among postentry Nash equilibria. Elimination of weakly dominated strategies makes it possible for the entrant to us a market-capturing strategy, consisting of a large capacity commitment that selects the entrant's preferred postentry equilibrium and drives the incumbent from the market. Deterring the entrant's market-capturing strategy typically requires the incumbent to reduce its initial capacity choice. As avoidable fixed costs rise, the incumben must restrict its capacity by a greater amount, and the relative advantage of the entrant rises.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1131.
Date of creation: May 1990
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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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