I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G telecom auctions. Relative-performance maximisation may have been important, but the outcome of the British auction seems to have been efficient. This paper bundles my comments on two papers presented at the December 2001 CES Ifo conference on the telecom auctions. (For those readers new to the subject, I recommend first reading "How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions" European Economic Review 2002 and at www.paulklemperer.org and "The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses" Economic Journal 2002 and also at www.paulklemperer.org.)
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Paper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number
2002-W20.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1994.
"Auctions vs. Negotiations,"
NBER Working Papers
4608, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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