Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated
AbstractIn this note I prove the existence of the optimal-pay auction when signals are correlated.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1997042.
Date of creation: 01 Jun 1997
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Other versions of this item:
- Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 2000. "Optimal All-pay Auction When Signals Are Correlated," Revista Brasileira de Economia, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil), vol. 54(2), pages 189-199, April.
- Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 1999. "Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated," Microeconomics 9901003, EconWPA, revised 21 Jan 1999.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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