Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated
AbstractIn this note I prove the existence of the optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 9901003.
Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: 20 Jan 1999
Date of revision: 21 Jan 1999
Note: Type of Document - Latex; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on HP; pages: 7
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optimal auction; all-pay auction; correlated signals;
Other versions of this item:
- Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 2000. "Optimal All-pay Auction When Signals Are Correlated," Revista Brasileira de Economia, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil), vol. 54(2), pages 189-199, April.
- KLINGER MONTEIRO, Paulo, 1997. "Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated," CORE Discussion Papers 1997042, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- D - Microeconomics
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