Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Paulo Klinger Monteiro

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 9901003.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: 20 Jan 1999
Date of revision: 21 Jan 1999
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:9901003

Note: Type of Document - Latex; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on HP; pages: 7
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research

Keywords: optimal auction; all-pay auction; correlated signals;

Other versions of this item:

• Article
  • Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 2000. "Optimal All-pay Auction When Signals Are Correlated," Revista Brasileira de Economia, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil), vol. 54(2), April.
• Paper
  • KLINGER MONTEIRO, Paulo, 1997. "Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated," CORE Discussion Papers 1997042, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-21.