This article studies the dynamic effects of behaviour-base price discrimination and customer recognition in a duopolistic market where the distribution of consumers' preferences is discrete. In the static and firs-period equilibrium firms choose prices with mixed strategies. When price discrimination is allowed, forward-looking firms have an incentive to avoid customer recognition, thus the probability that both will have positive first-period sales decreases as they become more patient. Furthermore, an asymmetric equilibrium sometimes exists, yielding a 100-0 division of the first-period sales. As a whole, price discrimination is bad for profits but good for consumer surplus and welfare.
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Paper provided by NIPE - Universidade do Minho in its series NIPE Working Papers with number
27/2007.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Michael R. Baye & John Morgan & Patrick Scholten, 2006.
"Persistent Price Dispersion in Online Markets,"
Working Papers
2006-12, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
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Varian, Hal R, 1980.
"A Model of Sales,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 651-59, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)