Learning about one’s own type in two-sided search
AbstractThis paper is an analysis of a two-sided search model in which agents are vertically heterogeneous and some agents do not know their own types. Agents who do not know their own types update their beliefs about their own types through the offers or rejections that they receive from others. In the belief-updating process, an agent who is unsure of his or her own type frequently behaves as an over- or underconfident agent. In this paper, we show that this apparent over- or underconfidence influences both on the individual’s and other agents’ matching behaviors. We show, especially, that the apparent overconfidence of some agents prevents the lowest-type agents from matching in an equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in its series GRIPS Discussion Papers with number 10-26.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2010
Date of revision:
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two-sided search; imperfect self-knowledge; overconfidence; looking-glass self;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2011-01-16 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-DGE-2011-01-16 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-NET-2011-01-16 (Network Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Dubra, Juan, 2007.
5505, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jean-Pierre Benoit & Juan Dubra, 2008. "Overconfidence," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 122247000000002148, www.najecon.org.
- Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Dubra, Juan, 2007. "Overconfidence?," MPRA Paper 6017, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Nov 2007.
- Jean Pierre Benoit & Juan Dubra, 2008. "Overconfidence?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002142, David K. Levine.
- Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Dubra, Juan, 2008. "Overconfidence?," MPRA Paper 8879, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Dubra, Juan, 2008. "Overconfidence?," MPRA Paper 765, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lu�s Santos-Pinto & Joel Sobel, 2005. "A Model of Positive Self-Image in Subjective Assessments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1386-1402, December.
- Akiko Maruyama, 2013. "Learning about one's own type: a search model with two-sided uncertainty," GRIPS Discussion Papers 12-24, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
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