Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Strategic Trade Policy with Endogenous Choice of Quality and Asymmetric Costs

Contents:

Author Info

  • Dongsheng Zhou
  • Barbara J. Spencer
  • Ilan Vertinsky

Abstract

This paper examines the strategic trade policy incentives for investment policies towards quality improvements in a vertically differentiated exporting industry. Firms first compete in qualities and then export to a third country market based on Bertrand or Cournot competition. Optimal policies are asymmetric across the two producing countries. Under Bertrand competition, the low-quality country subsidizes investment to raise export quality, while the high-quality country imposes a tax so as to reduce the quality of its already high quality exports. Under Cournot competition, the results are reversed with a tax in the low-quality country and a subsidy in the high-quality country.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w7536.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 7536.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7536

Note: ITI
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716.
  2. Das, Satya P. & Donnenfeld, Shabtai, 1989. "Oligopolistic competition and international trade : Quantity and quality restrictions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3-4), pages 299-318, November.
  3. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1990. "The Sensitivity of Strategic and Corrective R&D Policy in Oligopolistic Industries," NBER Working Papers 3236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Herguera, Iñigo & Kujal, Praveen & Petrakis, E., 2000. "Quantity Restrictions and Endogenous Quality Choice," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/5333, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
  5. Jaskold Gabszewicz, J. & Thisse, J. -F., 1979. "Price competition, quality and income disparities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 340-359, June.
  6. John C. Ries, 1993. "Voluntary Export Restraints, Profits, and Quality Adjustment," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(3), pages 688-706, August.
  7. Zhou, Dongsheng & Spencer, Barbara J. & Vertinsky, Ilan, 2002. "Strategic trade policy with endogenous choice of quality and asymmetric costs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 205-232, January.
  8. Motta, Massimo, 1993. "Endogenous Quality Choice: Price vs. Quantity Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 113-31, June.
  9. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1983. "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," NBER Working Papers 1192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Neary, J. Peter, 1994. "Cost asymmetries in international subsidy games: Should governments help winners or losers?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3-4), pages 197-218, November.
  11. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Motta, Massimo & Thisse, Jacques-Francois & Cabrales, Antonio, 1997. "On the Persistence of Leadership or Leapfrogging in International Trade," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(4), pages 809-24, November.
  13. Uri Ronnen, 1991. "Minimum Quality Standards, Fixed Costs, and Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 490-504, Winter.
  14. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly," NBER Working Papers 1236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. David de Meza, 1986. "Export Subsidies and High Productivity: Cause or Effect?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 19(2), pages 347-50, May.
  16. Analysis, A Welfare & Das, Satya P. & Donnenfeld, Shabtai, 1987. "Trade policy and its impact on quality of imports," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 77-95, August.
  17. Kala Krishna, 1988. "Tariffs vs. Quotas with Endogenous Quality," NBER Working Papers 1535, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Bond, Eric W., 1988. "Optimal commercial policy with quality-differentiated products," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 271-290, November.
  19. Aoki, Reiko & Prusa, Thomas J., 1997. "Sequential versus simultaneous choice with endogenous quality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 103-121, February.
  20. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1982. "Relaxing Price Competition through Product Differentiation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1), pages 3-13, January.
  21. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1983. "Natural Oligopolies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(5), pages 1469-83, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Hernán, Roberto & Kujal, Praveen, . "Import tariffs, quality investment and welfare," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/358, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
  2. Hélène LATZER & Florian MAYNERIS, 2012. "Income distribution and vertical comparative advantage Theory and evidence," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2012018, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), revised 20 Oct 2012.
  3. Oladi, Reza & Beladi, Hamid & Chau, Nancy, 2008. "Multinational corporations and export quality," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 147-155, January.
  4. Bonroy, Olivier, 2003. "Minimum Quality Standard and Protectionism," Cahiers de recherche 0302, GREEN.
  5. Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., 2004. "Market Reactions to Export Subsidies," NBER Working Papers 10233, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Klimenko, Mikhail M., 2009. "Policies and international trade agreements on technical compatibility for industries with network externalities," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 151-166, April.
  7. Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez & Jean-Marie Viaene, 2004. "Anti-dumping, Intra-industry Trade and Quality Reversals," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-124/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  8. Amacher, Gregory S. & Koskela, Erkki & Ollikainen, Markku, 2004. "Environmental quality competition and eco-labeling," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 284-306, March.
  9. José Luis Moraga Gonzales & Jean-Marie Viaene, 2001. "Procompetitive Trade Policies," CESifo Working Paper Series 597, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Kranich, Jan, 2009. "Agglomeration, innovation and international research mobility," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 817-830, September.
  11. Amacher, Gregory & Koskela, Erkki & Ollikainen, Markku, 2003. "Environmental Quality Competition and Eco-labeling," Discussion Papers 848, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
  12. Dimitra Petropoulou, 2007. "Vertical Product Differentiation, Minimum Quality Standards and International Trade," Economics Series Working Papers 352, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  13. José Luis Moraga-González & Jean-Marie Viaene, 2004. "Anti-Dumping, Intra-Industry Trade and Quality Reversals," CESifo Working Paper Series 1365, CESifo Group Munich.
  14. Zhou, Dongsheng & Spencer, Barbara J. & Vertinsky, Ilan, 2002. "Strategic trade policy with endogenous choice of quality and asymmetric costs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 205-232, January.
  15. Olivier Bonroy & Christos Constantatos, 2005. "Minimum Quality Standards and Equilibrium Selection with Asymmetric Firms," Industrial Organization 0506009, EconWPA.
  16. Michael L. Katz, 2006. "Observable Contracts as Commitments: Interdependent Contracts and Moral Hazard," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 685-706, 09.
  17. Dimitra Petropoulou, 2008. "International Trade, Minimum Quality Standards and the Prisoners' Dilemma," CEP Discussion Papers dp0858, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  18. Jan Kranich, 2008. "R&D and the agglomeration of industries," Working Paper Series in Economics 83, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7536

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.