I study the influence of minimum quality standards in a partial-equilibrium model of vertical product differentiation and trade in which duopolistic firms face quality-dependent costs and compete in quality and price in two segmented markets. Three alternative standard setting arrangements are Full Harmonization, National Treatment and Mutual Recognition. Under either alternative, standards can be found that increase welfare in both regions. The analysis integrates the choice of a particular standard setting alternative by governments into the model. Mutual Recognition emerges as one regulatory alternative that always improves welfare in both regions when compared to the case without regulation. Under certain cost conditions, both regions will prefer Mutual Recognition over all available alternatives. --
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Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number
03-41.
Find related papers by JEL classification: F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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