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The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange

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Author Info
David Genesove
Wallace P. Mullin

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Abstract

This paper describes information exchange under the Sugar Institute, the trade association of U.S. domestic sugar cane refiners, between 1928 and 1936. The Institute collected production and delivery data from the individual firms and returned it to them in aggregated form. Attempts to exchange sales data were stymied by the larger firms. Surprisingly, there is no indication of mis-reporting of statistics by Institute members, although statistics were, at times, withheld. The paper concentrates on the evolution of the Institute. Proposals for successor organizations show that a workable mechanism required greater discretion to the central authority and greater voting rights to the larger firms.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 5981.

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Date of creation: Mar 1997
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Publication status: published relationship to a non-chapter. This should not happen. Please contact NBER.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5981

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
B00 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - General - - - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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  1. Alison J. Kirby, 1988. "Trade Associations as Information Exchange Mechanisms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 138-146, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. William Novshek & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1982. "Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 214-218, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Creane, A., 1993. "Risk and Revelation: Changing the Value of Information," Papers 9209, Michigan State - Econometrics and Economic Theory.
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  5. Romer, Christina D, 1990. "The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(3), pages 597-624, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Ellison, Sara Fisher & Mullin, Wallace P, 1995. "Economics and Politics: The Case of Sugar Tariff Reform," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 335-66, October.
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  1. Panetta, Fabio & Schivardi, Fabiano & Shum, Matthew, 2005. "Do Mergers Improve Information? Evidence from the Loan Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 4961, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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