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The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange

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  • David Genesove
  • Wallace P. Mullin

Abstract

This paper describes information exchange under the Sugar Institute, the trade association of U.S. domestic sugar cane refiners, between 1928 and 1936. The Institute collected production and delivery data from the individual firms and returned it to them in aggregated form. Attempts to exchange sales data were stymied by the larger firms. Surprisingly, there is no indication of mis-reporting of statistics by Institute members, although statistics were, at times, withheld. The paper concentrates on the evolution of the Institute. Proposals for successor organizations show that a workable mechanism required greater discretion to the central authority and greater voting rights to the larger firms.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 5981.

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Date of creation: Mar 1997
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Publication status: published as Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries, Naomi Lamoreaux, Daniel M.G. Raff, and Peter Temin, eds., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999, pp. 103-138.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5981

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  1. Edward J Green & Robert H Porter, 1997. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1147, David K. Levine.
  2. Alison J. Kirby, 1988. "Trade Associations as Information Exchange Mechanisms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 138-146, Spring.
  3. Creane, A., 1993. "Risk and Revelation: Changing the Value of Information," Papers, Michigan State - Econometrics and Economic Theory 9209, Michigan State - Econometrics and Economic Theory.
  4. Romer, Christina D, 1990. "The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 105(3), pages 597-624, August.
  5. Ellison, Sara Fisher & Mullin, Wallace P, 1995. "Economics and Politics: The Case of Sugar Tariff Reform," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 335-66, October.
  6. William Novshek & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1982. "Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 214-218, Spring.
  7. Alfred D. Chandler, 1969. "Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262530090, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Fabio Panetta & Fabiano Schivardi & Matthew Shum, 2004. "Do mergers improve information? Evidence from the loan market," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area 521, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  2. Lee, Gea M., 2010. "Optimal collusion with internal contracting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 646-669, March.
  3. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2012. "Communication in Cournot Oligopoly," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics 20121, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  4. Martin, Stephen, 2006. "Competition policy, collusion, and tacit collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1299-1332, November.
  5. Dye, Alan & Sicotte, Richard, 2006. "How brinkmanship saved Chadbourne: Credibility and the International Sugar Agreement of 1931," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 223-256, April.

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