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How brinkmanship saved Chadbourne: Credibility and the International Sugar Agreement of 1931

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  • Dye, Alan
  • Sicotte, Richard

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  • Dye, Alan & Sicotte, Richard, 2006. "How brinkmanship saved Chadbourne: Credibility and the International Sugar Agreement of 1931," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 223-256, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:43:y:2006:i:2:p:223-256
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    1. Dasgupta, Sudipto & Nanda, Vikram, 1993. "Bargaining and brinkmanship : Capital structure choice by regulated firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 475-497.
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    3. David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, 2001. "Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 379-398, June.
    4. Levenstein, Margaret C, 1997. "Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A Study of the Pre-World War I Bromine Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 117-137, June.
    5. Glenn Ellison, 1994. "Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 37-57, Spring.
    6. David Genesove & Wallace Mullin, 1999. "The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange," NBER Chapters, in: Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries, pages 103-144, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Levenstein, Margaret C., 1996. "Do Price Wars Facilitate Collusion? A Study of the Bromine Cartel before World War I," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 107-137, January.
    8. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
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    10. Gil Montant, 2004. "The effectiveness of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais coal cartel during the inter-war period," Post-Print halshs-00150816, HAL.
    11. Gupta, Bishnupriya, 2001. "The International Tea Cartel During The Great Depression, 1929–1933," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(1), pages 144-159, March.
    12. McCutcheon, Barbara, 1997. "Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 330-350, April.
    13. Barry Nalebuff, 1986. "Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 9(2), pages 19-30, February.
    14. Montant, Gil, 2004. "The effectiveness of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais coal cartel during the inter-war period: a research note," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 300-307, July.
    15. Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Daniel M. G. Raff & Peter Temin, 1999. "Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number lamo99-1, March.
    16. Barbezat, Daniel, 1989. "Cooperation and Rivalry in the International Steel Cartel, 1926–1933," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(2), pages 435-447, June.
    17. Anonymous, 1961. "Food and Agriculture Organization," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 188-190, January.
    18. Anonymous, 1961. "Food and Agriculture Organization," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(4), pages 703-705, October.
    19. Margaret C. Levenstein, 1997. "Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A Study of the Pre‐World War I Bromine Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 117-137, June.
    20. William M. Dugger, 1996. "The Mechanisms of Governance," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(4), pages 1212-1216, December.
    21. Libecap, Gary D., 1989. "The Political Economy of Crude Oil Cartelization in the United States, 1933–1972," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 833-855, December.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Vellore Arthi & Markus Lampe & Ashwin Nair & Kevin Hjortshøj, 2023. "Deliberate Surrender? The Impact of Interwar Indian Protection," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(657), pages 23-47.
    3. Christian Fahrholz & Cezary Wójcik, 2010. "The Bail-Out! Positive Political Economics of Greek-type Crises in the EMU," CESifo Working Paper Series 3178, CESifo.
    4. Smith, Celina & Nordqvist, Mattias & De Massis, Alfredo & Miller, Danny, 2021. "When so much is at stake: Understanding organizational brinkmanship in family business," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4).
    5. Christian Fahrholz & Cezary Wójcik, 2012. "The Bail-Out! Positive Political Economics Of Greek-Type Crises In The Emu," Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy (JICEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 3(02), pages 1-18.
    6. Vellore Arthi & Markus Lampe & Ashwin Nair & Kevin Hjortshøj O'Rourke, 2020. "The Impact of Interwar Protection: Evidence from India," Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers _180, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    7. Reynolds, Bruce J., 2010. "Choosing to Defect from Cooperation—the 2003 Collapse of California Pear Bargaining," Journal of Cooperatives, NCERA-210, vol. 24, pages 1-20.
    8. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2011. "Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(2), pages 455-492.
    9. Perri 6 & Eva Heims & Martha Prevezer, 2023. "How did international economic regulation survive the last period of deglobalization?," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(1), pages 272-289, January.

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