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External Debt and Political Instability

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Author Info
Sule Ozler
Guido Tabellini

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Abstract

This paper studies theoretically and empirically the role of domestic political incentives in the accumulation of large external debts by developing countries during 1972-81. The theoretical model characterizes two equilibrium regimes. In one regime the borrower is on its demand curve and changes in the loan size demand are accommodated by the lenders. In the other regime the borrower is credit rationed, and the loan size is determined by the perceived country risk. Higher political instability increases the equilibrium loan size in the first regime and decreases it in the second. Using out-of-sample of evidence, we identify the two regimes in the data. We then find that in the unconstrained regime political instability has a significant positive effect on the loan size, whereas it has no significant effect in the credit rationing regime. Hence the evidence indicates a positive effect of political instability on the demand for sovereign loans, as predicted by the theory.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 3772.

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Date of creation: Jul 1991
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3772

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Eaton, Jonathan & Gersovitz, Mark, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hajivassiliou, Vassilis A., 1987. "The external debt repayments problems of LDC's : An econometric model based on panel data," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-2), pages 205-230. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jeffrey Sachs & Daniel Cohen, 1982. "LDC Borrowing with Default Risk," NBER Working Papers 0925, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Diwan, Ishac & Verdier, Thierry, 1991. "Distributional aspects of debt adjustment," Policy Research Working Paper Series 657, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ozler, Sule, 1989. "On the Relation between Reschedulings and Bank Value," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1117-31, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1986. "Capital mobility in the world economy: Theory and measurement," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 55-103, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1989. "External debt, capital flight and political risk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3-4), pages 199-220, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-78, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alesina, Alberto, 1992. "Political models of macroeconomic policy and fiscal reform," Policy Research Working Paper Series 970, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  2. Andrew Williams & Abu Siddique, 2008. "The use (and abuse) of governance indicators in economics: a review," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 131-175, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Robert Lavigne, 2006. "The Institutional and Political Determinants of Fiscal Adjustment," Working Papers 06-1, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  4. Massimo Morelli & Michele Tertilt, 2000. "Policy Stability under Different Electoral Systems," Working Papers 00-13, Ohio State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Johannes Fedderke, 2001. "Growth and institutions," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(6), pages 645-670. [Downloadable!]
  6. Tatiana Fic & Omar F. Saqib, 2006. "Political Instability and the August 1998 Ruble Crisis," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 626, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. Nauro F. Campos & Jeffrey B. Nugent, 2001. "Who Is Afraid Of Political Instability?," Development and Comp Systems 0012016, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. James L. Butkiewicz & Halit Yanikkaya, 2005. "Time-Consistent Polities and Growth in Developing Countries: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers 05-02, University of Delaware, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Alberto Alesina & Sule Ozler & Nouriel Roubini & Phillip Swagel, 1992. "Political Instability and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 4173, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Shamit Chakravarti & Rina Bhattacharya & Benedict J. Clements & Sanjeev Gupta, 2002. "Fiscal Consequences of Armed Conflict and Terrorism in Low- and Middle-Income Countries," IMF Working Papers 02/142, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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