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Sanctions

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  • Jonathan Eaton
  • Maxim Engers

Abstract

Sanctions are measures that one party (the sender) takes to influence the actions of another (the target). Sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, have been used, for example, by creditors to get a foreign sovereign to repay debt or by one government to influence the human rights, trade, or foreign policies of another government. Sanctions can harm the sender as well as the target. The credibility of such sanctions is thus at issue. We examine, in a game-theoretic framework, whether sanctions that harm both parties enable the sender to extract concessions. We find that they can, and that their thrust alone can suffice when they are contingent on the target's subsequent behavior. Even when sanctions are not used in equilibrium, however, how much compliance they can extract typically depends upon the coats that they would impose on each party.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 3399.

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Date of creation: Jul 1990
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Publication status: published as Journal of Political Economy Volume 100, No. 5, pp. 899-928 October 1992
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3399

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  1. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth S., 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Scholarly Articles, Harvard University Department of Economics 12491028, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  2. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-39, May.
  3. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1987. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt9wv3h5jb, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  4. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-78, February.
  5. Raquel Fernandez & Jacob Glazer, 1989. "Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 3108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  7. Eaton, Jonathan & Engers, Maxim, 1990. "Intertemporal Price Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 637-59, May.
  8. Cyert, Richard M & DeGroot, M H, 1970. "Multiperiod Decision Models with Alternating Choice as a Solution to the Duopoly Problem," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 410-29, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Brian D. Wright & Kenneth M. Kletzer, 2000. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 621-639, June.
  2. Maxim Engers & Jonathan Eaton, 1999. "Sanctions: Some Simple Analytics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 409-414, May.

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