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Moral Hazard Misconceptions: the Case of the Greenspan Put

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  • Gideon Bornstein
  • Guido Lorenzoni

Abstract

Policy discussions on financial market regulation tend to assume that whenever a corrective policy is used ex post to ameliorate the effects of a crisis, there are negative side effects in terms of moral hazard ex ante. This paper shows that this is not a general theoretical prediction, focusing on the case of monetary policy interventions ex post. In particular, we show that if the central bank does not intervene by monetary easing following a crisis, this creates an aggregate demand externality that makes borrowing ex ante inefficient. If instead the central bank follows the optimal discretionary policy and intervenes to stabilize asset prices and real activity, we show examples in which the aggregate demand externality disappears, reducing the need for ex ante intervention.

Suggested Citation

  • Gideon Bornstein & Guido Lorenzoni, 2017. "Moral Hazard Misconceptions: the Case of the Greenspan Put," NBER Working Papers 24050, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24050
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    1. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2012. "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 60-93, February.
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    3. Benigno, Gianluca & Chen, Huigang & Otrok, Christopher & Rebucci, Alessandro & Young, Eric R., 2016. "Optimal capital controls and real exchange rate policies: A pecuniary externality perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 147-165.
    4. Anton Korinek & Alp Simsek, 2016. "Liquidity Trap and Excessive Leverage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(3), pages 699-738, March.
    5. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2012. "Illiquid Banks, Financial Stability, and Interest Rate Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(3), pages 552-591.
    6. Emmanuel Farhi & Iván Werning, 2016. "A Theory of Macroprudential Policies in the Presence of Nominal Rigidities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1645-1704, September.
    7. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé & Martín Uribe, 2016. "Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity, Currency Pegs, and Involuntary Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1466-1514.
    8. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2016. "Bailouts, Time Inconsistency, and Optimal Regulation: A Macroeconomic View," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(9), pages 2458-2493, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. William Chen & Gregory Phelan, 2023. "Should Monetary Policy Target Financial Stability," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 49, pages 181-200, July.
    2. Andrea Ajello & Nina Boyarchenko & François Gourio & Andrea Tambalotti, 2022. "Financial Stability Considerations for Monetary Policy: Theoretical Mechanisms," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2022-005, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Chirinko, Robert, 2023. "What went wrong? The Puerto Rican debt crisis, the “Treasury Put,” and the failure of market discipline," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    4. Fernando Arce & Julien Bengui & Javier Bianchi, 2023. "Overborrowing, Underborrowing, and Macroprudential Policy," Working Papers 798, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    5. Ricardo J Caballero & Alp Simsek, 2021. "A Model of Endogenous Risk Intolerance and LSAPs: Asset Prices and Aggregate Demand in a “COVID-19” Shock [Financial intermediaries and the cross-section of asset returns]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(11), pages 5522-5580.
    6. Bank for International Settlements, 2019. "Unconventional monetary policy tools: a cross-country analysis," CGFS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 63, december.
    7. policy, Work stream on macroprudential & Policy, Monetary & Stability, Financial & Albertazzi, Ugo & Martin, Alberto & Assouan, Emmanuelle & Tristani, Oreste & Galati, Gabriele & Vlassopoulos, Thomas , 2023. "The role of financial stability considerations in monetary policy and the interaction with macroprudential policy in the euro area," Occasional Paper Series 272, European Central Bank.
    8. Xiaoshan Chen & Eric M. Leeper & Campbell Leith, 2022. "Strategic interactions in U.S. monetary and fiscal policies," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), pages 593-628, May.
    9. policy, Work stream on macroprudential & Albertazzi, Ugo & Martin, Alberto & Assouan, Emmanuelle & Tristani, Oreste & Galati, Gabriele & Vlassopoulos, Thomas, 2021. "The role of financial stability considerations in monetary policy and the interaction with macroprudential policy in the euro area," Occasional Paper Series 272, European Central Bank.
    10. William Chen & Gregory Phelan, 2023. "Should Monetary Policy Target Financial Stability," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 49, pages 181-200, July.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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