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Understanding Social Interactions: Evidence from the Classroom

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  • Giacomo De Giorgi
  • Michele Pellizzari

Abstract

Little is known about the economic mechanisms leading to the high level of clustering in behavior commonly observed in the data. We present a model where agents can interact according to three distinct mechanisms, and we derive testable implications which allow us to distinguish between the proposed mechanisms. In our application we study students’ performance and we find that a mutual insurance mechanism is consistent with the data. Such a result bears important policy implications for all those situations in which social interactions are important, from teamwork to class formation in education and co-authorship in academic research.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 19202.

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Date of creation: Jul 2013
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19202

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  1. Bramoullé, Yann & Djebbari, Habiba & Fortin, Bernard, 2009. "Identification of peer effects through social networks," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 150(1), pages 41-55, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Giacomo De Giorgi & Michele Pellizzari & Silvia Redaelli, 2010. "Identification of Social Interactions through Partially Overlapping Peer Groups," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 241-75, April.
  2. Edmark, Karin & Frölich, Markus & Wondratschek, Verena, 2014. "Sweden’s School Choice Reform and Equality of Opportunity," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 1030, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  3. Lucifora, Claudio & Tonello, Marco, 2012. "Students' Cheating as a Social Interaction: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in a National Evaluation Program," IZA Discussion Papers 6967, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Marco Tonello, 2011. "Mechanisms of peer interactions between native and non-native students: rejection or integration?," Working Papers 2011/21, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).

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