Predation, Economic Activity and Violence: Evidence from the Philippines
AbstractThis paper explores the relationship between economic activity and political violence through the lenses provided by several different mechanisms. Investment as a predictor of future violence implies that low private sector investment today provides a robust indicator of high violence tomorrow. “Rent-capture” or predation asserts that economic programs and business investment will increase violence by increasing extortion by insurgents. “Hearts and minds” counterinsurgency has been asserted to link economic activity to political violence in three ways, through an opportunity cost mechanism by which improved economic conditions reduce the cost of rebel recruitment; through a “hope and gratitude” effect by which development assistance generates support for government, reducing cooperation with rebels; and thirdly, though an improved governance mechanism. We lay out these mechanisms in a framework with strategic interaction between rebels, communities, government and firms within an information-centric “hearts and minds” counterinsurgency model. We test the mechanisms in the context of the Philippines in the first decade of this century, using a new dataset that combines violent incidents with indicators of economic activity. The data support the predation thesis, while refuting the predictions of the predictive investment mechanism, the opportunity cost mechanism, and the gratitude effect.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 18375.
Date of creation: Sep 2012
Date of revision:
Note: PE POL
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F52 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
- F54 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - Colonialism; Imperialism; Postcolonialism
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- N47 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Africa; Oceania
- O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.