Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games
AbstractAgents in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on matching markets. We investigate the identification of the distribution of these unobserved characteristics using data on who matches with whom. The distribution of match-specific unobservables cannot be fully recovered without information on unmatched agents, but the distribution of a combination of unobservables, which we call unobserved complementarities, can be identified. Knowledge of the unobserved complementarities is sufficient to construct certain counterfactuals. The distribution of agent-specific unobservables is identified under different conditions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 18168.
Date of creation: Jun 2012
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
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- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
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- Yingying Dong & Arthur Lewbel, 2004.
"A Simple Estimator for Binary Choice Models with Endogenous Regressors,"
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- Yingying Dong & Arthur Lewbel, 2012. "A Simple Estimator for Binary Choice Models With Endogenous Regressors," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 807, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Arthur Lewbel, 2012. "An Overview of the Special Regressor Method," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 810, Boston College Department of Economics.
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