This paper develops aggregate relations for a matching market of heterogeneous suppliers and demanders. The point of departure is the analysis of two-sided matching found in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). Under particular assumptions about the distribution of preferences, the present paper derives asymptotic aggregate relations for the number of realized matches of different types in the presence of flexible contracts (such as a price). Simulation experiments demonstrate that the model also provides excellent predictions in small populations.
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Paper provided by Research Department of Statistics Norway in its series Discussion Papers with number
173.
Dagsvik, John K, 2000.
"Aggregation in Matching Markets,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 27-57, February.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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