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Matching with Trade-offs: Revealed Preferences over Competiting Characteristics

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Author Info

  • Alfred Galichon

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Bernard Salanié

    (Columbia University - Columbia University)

Abstract

We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteria. The surplus from a marriage match, for instance, may depend both on the incomes and on the educations of the partners, as well as on characteristics that the analyst does not observe. The social optimum must therefore trade off matching on incomes and matching on educations. Given a exible specification of the surplus function, we characterize under mild assumptions the properties of the set of feasible matchings and of the socially optimal matching. Then we show how data on the covariation of the types of the partners in observed matches can be used to estimate the parameters that define social preferences over matches. We provide both nonparametric and parametric procedures that are very easy to use in applications.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00473173.

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Date of creation: 14 Apr 2010
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00473173

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Keywords: matching; marriage; assignment.;

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References

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  1. Pierre-André Chiappori & Sonia Oreffice & Climent Quintana, 2009. "Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Characteristics in the Marriage Market," Working Papers 2009-34, FEDEA.
  2. Eugene Choo & Aloysius Siow, 2006. "Who Marries Whom and Why," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 175-201, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Oreffice, Sonia & Quintana-Domeque, Climent, 2010. "Matching with a Handicap: The Case of Smoking in the Marriage Market," IZA Discussion Papers 5392, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Bernard Salanié & Alfred Galichon, 2011. "Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models," Discussion Papers 1011-03, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  3. Jeremy T. Fox & Chenyu Yang, 2012. "Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games," NBER Working Papers 18168, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Sonia Oreffice & Climent Quintana-Domeque, 2011. "Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage Market," Discussion Papers 1011-06, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  5. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2010. "Risk and the CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?," NBER Working Papers 15987, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Alfred Galichon & Arnaud Dupuy, 2012. "Personality traits and the marriage market," Sciences Po publications 6943, Sciences Po.

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