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Are Policy Platforms Capitalized into Equity Prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election

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Brian Knight

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Abstract

This paper tests for the capitalization of policy platforms into equity prices using a sample of 70 firms favored under Bush or Gore platforms during the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election. Two sources of daily data during the six months leading up to the election are incorporated: firm-specific equity returns and the probability of a Bush victory as implied by prices from the Iowa electronic market. For this group of politically-sensitive firms, the daily baseline estimates demonstrate that platforms are capitalized into equity prices: under a Bush administration, relative to a counterfactual Gore administration, Bush-favored firms are worth 3 percent more and Gore-favored firms are worth 6 percent less, implying a statistically significant differential return of 9 percent. The most sensitive sectors include tobacco, worth 13 percent more under a favorable Bush administration, Microsoft competitors, worth 15 percent less under an unfavorable Bush administration, and alternative energy companies, worth 16 percent less under an unfavorable Bush administration. A corresponding analysis of campaign contributions, which allows for heterogeneity in the importance of policy platforms to the firms, supports the baseline estimates. These results are then compared with results from a more traditional event study based upon the Florida recount.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10333.

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Date of creation: Mar 2004
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10333

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D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
H0 - Public Economics - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Federico Cingano & Paolo Pinotti, 2009. "Politicians at work. The private returns and social costs of political connections," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 709, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler, 2008. "Corporate Campaign Contributions as a Predictor for Abnormal Stock Returns after Presidential Elections," Working Papers 2008-18, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
  3. Wolfers, Justin & Zitzewitz, Eric, 2006. "Prediction Markets in Theory and Practice," Research Papers 1927, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Joachim Voth & Thomas Ferguson, 2008. "Betting on Hitler: The Value of Political Connections in Nazi Germany," Economics Working Papers 1183, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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