Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule
AbstractThe cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of diferent authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang  we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsibility of each region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing costs "fairly" and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility of regions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra in its series Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra with number 1301.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in
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Other versions of this item:
- Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Maria Gomez-Rua & Elena Molis, 2013. "Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule," ThE Papers 13/03, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
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- Wang, Yuntong, 2011. "Trading water along a river," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 124-130, March.
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- Rene van den Brink & Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2010.
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Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
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- Beard, Rodney, 2011. "The river sharing problem: A review of the technical literature for policy economists," MPRA Paper 34382, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2012. "Transboundary Externalities and Property Rights: An International River Pollution Model," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-006/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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