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What do People Value when they Negotiate? Mapping the Domain of Subjective Value in Negotiation

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  • Curhan, Jared R.
  • Elfenbein, Hillary Anger
  • Xu, Heng
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    Abstract

    Four studies provide support for the development and validation of a framework for understanding the range of social psychological outcomes valued subjectively as consequences of negotiations. Study 1 inductively elicited and coded elements of subjective value among students, community members, and negotiation practitioners, revealing 20 categories that negotiation theorists in Study 2 sorted to reveal four underlying dimensions: Feelings about Instrumental Outcomes, the Self, Process, and Relationship. Study 3 proposed a new Subjective Value Inventory (SVI) questionnaire and confirmed its 4-factor structure, and Study 4 presents convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity data for this SVI. Results suggest the SVI is a promising tool to systematize and encourage research on the subjective outcomes of negotiation.

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/18234
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management in its series Working papers with number 18234.

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    Date of creation: 29 Jul 2005
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    Handle: RePEc:mit:sloanp:18234

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    Postal: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA
    Phone: 617-253-2659
    Web page: http://mitsloan.mit.edu/
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    Postal: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA

    Related research

    Keywords: Negotiation; social psychological outcomes; subjective value;

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

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    1. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-91, March.
    2. White, Judith B. & Tynan, Renee & Galinsky, Adam D. & Thompson, Leigh, 2004. "Face threat sensitivity in negotiation: Roadblock to agreement and joint gain," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 102-124, July.
    3. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
    4. Thompson, Leigh & Hastie, Reid, 1990. "Social perception in negotiation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 98-123, October.
    5. Steven Mestdagh & Marc Buelens, 2003. "Thinking back on where we're going :a methodological assessment of five decades of research in negotiation behavior. Some preliminary findings..," Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School Working Paper Series 2003-21, Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School.
    6. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    7. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    8. Tinsley, Catherine H. & O'Connor, Kathleen M. & Sullivan, Brandon A., 2002. "Tough guys finish last: the perils of a distributive reputation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 621-642, July.
    9. Oliver, Richard L. & Balakrishnan, P. V. (Sundar) & Barry, Bruce, 1994. "Outcome Satisfaction in Negotiation: A Test of Expectancy Disconfirmation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 252-275, November.
    10. Northcraft, Gregory B. & Brodt, Susan E. & Neale, Margaret A., 1995. "Negotiating with Nonlinear Subjective Utilities: Why Some Concessions Are More Equal Than Others," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 298-310, September.
    11. Mannix, Elizabeth A. & Tinsley, Catherine H. & Bazerman, Max, 1995. "Negotiating over Time: Impediments to Integrative Solutions," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 241-251, June.
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    Cited by:
    1. Königstein, Manfred & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2005. "The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations," IZA Discussion Papers 1762, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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