Organisational Structures in Network Industries – An Application to the Railway Industry
Abstract
This paper analyses the incentives to upgrade input quality in vertically related (network) industries. Upstream investments have a biased effect on the downstream companies and lead to vertical product differentiation. Different vertical structures such as vertical integration, ownership and legal unbundling lead to different investments. We find that, without regulation, vertical integration and legal unbundling regimes provide highest investment incentives and lead to highest welfare. However, we also find foreclosure in the downstream market if the potential degree of horizontal product differentiation of the entrant is low. Under ownership unbundling, investment incentives are lower but there is never foreclosure of the entrant since this would worsen double marginalisation. When the network operator is subject to a break-even regulation, the investment incentives are crowded out under legal and ownership unbundling whereas they remain nearly unchanged under vertical integration. Welfare and co umer surplus decrease under legal unbundling, but increase under the two other regimes.Download Info
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Paper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series MAGKS Papers on Economics with number 201109.Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in
Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201109
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Related research
Keywords: Vertical Integration; Investment; Foreclosure; Regulation;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-04-02 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-NET-2011-04-02 (Network Economics)
- NEP-REG-2011-04-02 (Regulation)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Russell Pittman, 2007. "Make or buy on the Russian railway? Coase, Williamson, and Tsar Nicholas II," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 207-221, September.
- Thomas Ehrmann & Karl-Hans Hartwig & Torsten Marner & Hendrik Schmale, 2009. "Specific Investments and Ownership Structures in Railways – An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 12, Institute of Transport Economics, University of Muenster.
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