Strategic interactions, incomplete information and learning
AbstractIn a model of incomplete, heterogeneous information, with externalities and strategic interactions, we analyse the possibility of adaptive learning to act as coordination device. We build on the framework introduced by Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and extend it to a setting where agents need to learn to coordinate. We analyse conditions under which learning obtains, and show that adaptive learning can solve the problem of socially ine¢ cient coordination.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester in its series Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series with number 157.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Berardi, Michele, 2012. "Strategic interactions, incomplete information and learning," MPRA Paper 38651, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CSE-2011-04-30 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-CTA-2011-04-30 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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