Are discriminatory procurement policies motivated by protectionism ?
AbstractWhen purchasing goods and services, governments often discriminate in favor of domestic suppliers. It is widely assumed that such behavior is motivated by protectionism. Although this interpretation is sometimes valid, it is also puzzling. After reviewing some of the puzzles, the paper proposes an alternative explanation of preferential procurement based on the assumption that governmental buyers want to purchase goods and services at minimum cost but must do this in a context in which, because of the presence of unverifiable services, contracts are necessarily incomplete. The paper argues that preferential purchasing can guarantee the efficient delivery of these unverifiable services. Copyright 1996 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne in its series LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) with number 1995-10.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Sep 1995
Date of revision:
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protectionism ; government procurement ; incomplete contracts ; Protectionnisme ; achats publics ; contrats incomplets;
Other versions of this item:
- Breton, Albert & Salmon, Pierre, 1996. "Are Discriminatory Procurement Policies Motivated by Protectionism?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1), pages 47-68.
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- Evenett, Simon J. & Hoekman, Bernard M., 2004.
"Government procurement : Market access, transparency, and multilateral trade rules,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
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- Shingal, ANIRUDH, 2011. "Foreign market access in government procurement," MPRA Paper 32814, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Michele Santoni, 2002. "Discriminatory Procurement Policy with Cash Limits," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 27-45, January.
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