The World Trade Organization's voluntary rules on government procurement are a useful mechanism for ensuring that public procurement procedures are efficient. They also provide an opportunity to reduce the uncertainty of participants by increasing transparency and accountability. Yet most developing countries have chosen not to subject their procurement policies to international disciplines and multilateral surveillance. Their reasons may include an unfamiliarity with the government procurement agreement (GPA); a perception that the potential payoffs are small; a desire to discriminate in favor of domestic firms; or the successful opposition of groups that benefit from the current regimes. Although the economic rationales for abstaining from the GPA are not compelling, a quid pro quo for accession may be needed to overcome opposition by special interests. Developing country procurement markets are large enough that governments may be able to make accession to the GPA conditional on temporary exceptions to multilateral disciplines or on better access to export markets. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Volume (Year): 13 (1998) Issue (Month): 2 (August) Pages: 249-69 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:oup:wbrobs:v:13:y:1998:i:2:p:249-69
Contact details of provider: Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK Fax: 01865 267 985 Email: Web page: http://wbro.oxfordjournals.org/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1993.
"Corruption,"
NBER Working Papers
4372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)